A rail industry report into the fatal train derailment at Grayrigg in Cumbria has concluded that poor maintenance and inspection of points by Network Rail led to the accident.

The report, published on 4 September 2007, makes a series of recommendations to Network Rail, which owns and manages the track, to improve maintenance to minimise the risk of such an incident recurring.

Virgin Trains today after the report was published, that it would offer any necessary help to Network Rail, which must implement changes recommended as a result of the
accident, caused by deterioration of a set of points.

The accident, on 23 February 2007, caused a Virgin Trains Pendolino to be derailed at Grayrigg, resulting in the death of Mrs Margaret Masson and injuries to several other Virgin Trains customers and staff.

The report makes clear that deterioration of components in facing points led to the derailment of the Virgin Trains Pendolino at Grayrigg, near Kendal.

The report lists the following underlying causes, as well as contributory causes.

* Deficiencies in the asset inspection and maintenance regime in the local area resulted in the deterioration of points at Lambrigg, near the village of Grayrigg, not being identified. These deficiencies included:
* A breakdown in the local management/supervisory structure that leads, monitors and regulates asset inspection and maintenance activities
* A systematic failure in the track patrolling regime employed on the Carnforth area, which covers Grayrigg
* The issue and subsequent briefing of mandated standards not being carried out in a robust and auditable manner
* A lack of sample verification to test the quality and arrangements for inspections undertaken
* The routine basic visual patrol was not undertaken at Lambrigg 2B points on the 18 February 2007.
* The self assurance and audit regime failed to identify system failures in the application of safe systems of work and reliability of inspection regimes.
* With the introduction of Enhanced Permissable Speed (EPS) - 125mph - running in December 2005 and the interim arrangements for access to the WCML [for maintenance and inspection] no structured assessment was undertaken to establish if sufficient resources existed. Management systems employed on the Lancs and Cumbria area were not sufficiently robust and embedded so as to ensure that any risk arising from the change to maintenance practices was controlled.